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TO THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO
RICO: IGARTUA DE LA ROSA v. UNITED
STATES
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INTRODUCTION

In the United States, the right to vote has been held to be
fundamental' and preservative of all other rights. 2 Though
restricted at the founding of the republic,3 its scope has been
consistently expanded 4 through constitutional amendments, 5
t J.D. Candidate, June 2002, St. John's University School of Law.
1 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) ("The right to vote freely for
the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government.").
2 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (holding the right to vote is
"not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded by
society according to its will, under certain conditions, nevertheless it is regarded as
a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights").
3 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554-55.
4 See id. at 555.
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."); id. amend. XIX ("The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex."). The Twenty-Third Amendment provides:
The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall
appoint in such a manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors
of President and Vice President... shall be considered, for the purposes of
the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a
State ....
Id. amend. XXIII. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other
election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice
President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States orany State by reason of failure to
pay poll tax or other tax.
Id. amend. XXIV, § 1. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment provides that "[tihe right of
citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age."
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legislative enactments, 6 and court decisions.7 Although a
citizen's right to vote is constitutionally protected, 8 it is not of
constitutional origin,9 but rather, it is a function of individual
state sovereignty. 10 The states, therefore, retain the right to
direct the exercise of the right to vote so long as the pertinent
state statutes do not violate applicable provisions of the
Constitution of the United States." As a fundamental right, any
federal or state legislative or executive action alleged to infringe
upon the exercise of the franchise would be subject to judicial
12
review under strict scrutiny.
Id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
6 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2001) (Voting Rights Act of 1965); see also id. §
1973ff (codifying the Uniform and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, which
affords U.S. citizens relocating overseas an opportunity to vote in presidential and
vice presidential elections by absentee ballot in their last state of residence prior to
relocating outside of the United States).
7 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554 (1964) ("A consistent line of decisions by this
Court in cases involving attempts to deny or restrict the right of suffrage has made
this [constitutional protection of the right to vote] indelibly clear."); see also Igartua
de la Rosa v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140, 145 (D.P.R. 2000) ('The history of
the United States is largely characterized by the enfranchisement of segments
within its citizenry."). This may be considered a narrow and somewhat misleading
interpretation of the historic development of American jurisprudence. It is far more
accurate to regard the historic development as a recognition and expansion of both
an increasing number of, and protection for, individual liberties. See, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 409 U.S. 817 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953). One such liberty is the right to vote.
8 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554 ("Undeniably the Constitution of the United
States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal
elections.").
9 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 647 (1966) (noting that while it is
the states' province to establish qualifications for voting, they do not have the power
to grant or withhold such power in violation of the Constitution).
10 See id. at 647 ("[The States have no power to grant or withhold the franchise
on conditions that are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment."). Implicit in this
statement is the notion that it is within the power of the state to withhold the
franchise, so long as the conditions of the denial comport with the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the right to vote is extended to the citizen through
the sovereign powers of the individual states. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
370 (1886) (noting that while sovereignty is "not subject to law" and remains with
the people, sovereign powers are delegated to divisions of government and limited
by the Constitution).
11 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 647 (holding the states can regulate qualifications of
voters to the extent the regulations do not infringe on the rights of its individual
citizens protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
12 See, e.g., Burdik v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (stating that judicial
review at a level of strict scrutiny is reserved for legislation alleged to either
infringe on rights held to be fundamental, or adversely impact suspect population
classes). In order to meet its burden and to preserve the contested legislation, the
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Despite the fundamental nature of the right to vote, and the
subsequent judicial protections contingent upon it, not all United
13
States citizens can vote for President or Vice President.
Citizens residing in any of the several territories belonging to
the United States 14 are effectively denied the right to vote in
presidential and vice presidential elections 15 due to express
provisions in the Constitution of the United States. 16 These
provisions grant the right to vote to the several states, rather
than to individual citizens of the United States.1 7 Consequently,
United States citizen residents of the territories have a
fundamental right to vote,' 8 but are excluded from participation
in presidential elections because of their territorial residency. 19

government must show the classification or action is necessary to promote a
compelling government interest and the act must be narrowly tailored to meet the
government's objectives. See id. Meeting this burden is extremely difficult, but not
impossible. In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Court upheld
the internment of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent during World War II. See id. at
219. When viewed in contemporary context, Korematsu is a highly suspect decision
and sometimes seen as a product of post Pearl Harbor hysteria. In the context of
1944, the security interest of the United States, without knowing how the war
would end, could be seen as being jeopardized by concerns for espionage and
sabotage, as such, the decision can be justified.
13See Attorney General of Guam v. United States, 738 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir.
1984) (holding U.S. citizens residing in the territories cannot vote in presidential or
vice presidential elections).
14 See Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal RelationshipsBetween the United
States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 445, 447 (1992)
(identifying U.S. flag territories as the Territory of American Samoa, the Territory
of Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands, the Territory of the
U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico). It should be noted the
differences between "commonwealth" and "territory" are irrelevant with respect to
presidential or vice presidential elections. Neither a commonwealth or a territory is
a state, nor are either treated as such for these purposes.
15 For simplicity, subsequent reference to the presidential election will include
the concurrent vice presidential election.
16 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (granting the right to vote for the President to the
states through the power to appoint electors at the discretion of the state
legislature).
17 See Attorney General of Guam, 738 F.2d at 1019 (noting that although the
holding was specific to the Territory of Guam, it has been held to apply to all U.S.
flag territories whdre the issue of participation in presidential elections by
territorial residents has been litigated); see also Igartua de la Rosa v. United States,
32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994); Romeu v. Cohen, 121 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(holding U.S. citizen residents of Puerto Rico cannot vote in presidential elections
because of Article HI, Section 1, not because of the alleged unconstitutionality of the
Voting Rights Act or Uniform and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act).
Is See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964).
19 See Attorney Generalof Guam, 738 F.2d at 1019 (holding territorial residents
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Recently, in Igartua de la Rosa v. United States,20 the
United States District Court for Puerto Rico addressed the
seemingly conflicting propositions between authorities holding
the right to vote to be fundamental, 21 and the express provisions
of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution of the United States. 22
The Igartuade la Rosa court radically departed from case law23
in interpreting the express provisions of the Constitution2 4 and
finding that United States citizen residents of Puerto Rico 25 have
a fundamental right to vote in presidential elections. 26
Furthermore, the court ordered steps be taken to implement a
voting scheme and to have the vote totals included in the final
cannot vote in presidential elections because Guam is not a state).
20 113 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D.P.R. 2000), rev'd, 229 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000). The
entire matter at the district court level is comprised of two decisions. The first,
Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.P.R. 2000), is an opinion
and order dated July 19, 2000, containing a "substantial discussion of the merits."
In a second decision, Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 2d 228, 231
(D.P.R. 2000), the court specifically held that U.S. citizen residents of Puerto Rico
had a fundamental right to vote for President and Vice President of the United
States and stated: "the Court hereby adopts and incorporates said opinion and order
[contained in Igartuade la Rosa u. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.P.R. 2000)]
to form part hereof and to be read together herewith." For simplicity, each part of
the opinion will be cited respectively as elements of each are discussed.
Additionally, the reader should be aware of Igartuade la Rosa v. United States, 842
F. Supp. 607 (D.P.R. 1994), affd, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994), in which the same lead
plaintiff as in the instant matter litigated a substantially similar claim. See Igartua
de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80, 84 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding the claim in the
2000 case was the same that was raised in 1994).
21 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (expressing a sense of the sanctity of the vote).
22 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
23 See Romeu v. Cohen, 121 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding U.S.
citizen residents cannot vote in presidential elections because of Article II, Section
1, not because of the alleged unconstitutionality of either the Voting Rights Act or
the Uniform and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act); Igartua de la Rosa, 842 F.
Supp. at 607 (holding claim for declaratory judgment on ability of U.S. citizen
residents of Puerto Rico to vote in presidential elections because Puerto Rico had
become a de facto state presented a non-justiciable political question), affd, 32 F.3d
8 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding the right to elect a President is held by the several states,
not individual citizens); Attorney General of Guam, 738 F.2d at 1020 (holding that
as residents of Guam, U.S. citizens cannot vote in presidential elections as Guam is
not a state); Sanchez v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 239 (D.P.R. 1974) (stating that
a claim made by a U.S. citizen resident of Puerto Rico, that keeping him from the
presidential ballot box was unconstitutional, was deemed to be "meritless" by the
court and was dismissed due to the language of Article II, Section 1).
24 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
25 See 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (1989) (granting U.S. citizenship to residents of Puerto
Rico).
26 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 2d 228, 242 (D.P.R.
2000).
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tally of the Electoral College.2 7 Standing squarely on judicial
precedent holding the right to vote to be fundamental, 28 the
district court courageously asserted the right to vote is a function
of United States citizenship, inherent in and derived from the
Constitution rather than residence in a particular venue. On
appeal, the judgment of the district court was reversed, vacated,
and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss the action
29
with prejudice.
Despite the brief interval between the district court opinion
and the subsequent reversal at the appellate level, the district
court's holding remains important as it questions not only the
foundation of the political relationship between the United
States and Puerto Rico, but also the traditional judicial
interpretation of both the origin and political underpinnings of a
citizen's right to vote. Moreover, the district court's analysis of
Article II, Section 1 as a mere mechanism is an additional cause
for reflection given the results of the 2000 presidential election. 30
Most importantly, the district court's holding is forcing an
evaluation of a remaining bastion of inequality in American
society. This inequality is the distinct, and outrageous disparity
in United States citizenship, as reflected in the scope of the right
to vote for U.S. citizens residing in one of the several states as
compared to U.S. citizens residing in one of the several
territories.
In Igartuade la Rosa, plaintiffs31 asked for declaratory relief
See id.
See Igartua de ]a Rosa v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140, 148 (D.P.R.
2000) (citing Westbury v. Saunders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964)).
29 See Igartuade la Rosa, 229 F.3d 80, 85 (1st Cir. 2000).
30 In the closest presidential election since 1960, Vice President Albert Gore Jr.
won the national popular vote with a plurality of over 500,000 votes, and Texas
Governor George W. Bush (now President of the United States) won by five votes in
the Electoral College by securing a narrow plurality in the state of Florida. See
Edward Walsh & Juliet Eilperin, Gore Presides As Congress Tallies Votes Electing
Bush, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2001, at Al (noting several last minute objections
brought by members of the House to the official tally of Electors). Having "two
winners" prompted a call for the elimination of the Electoral College, and a promise
by Hillary Rodham Clinton, the junior Senator from the State of New York, to
introduce legislation to do so. See Peter G.Fitzgerald, Electoral College Doesn'tNeed
Fixing, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 6, 2001, at 10 (noting Senator Clinton has been
joined in her effort to eliminate the Electoral College by Senator Richard Durbin
and Representative Ray LaHood).
31 See Compl. 2-4 (identifying plaintiffs as six individuals who were currently
United States citizens and residents of Puerto Rico, who had previously voted in
presidential elections based on prior residency in one of the several states, and five
27
28
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designed to "redress the deprivation of rights and privileges
secured [to] plaintiffs and all other U.S. Citizens residents of
Puerto Rico, under the Constitution of the United States of
America to vote in presidential elections."3 2
Specifically,
plaintiffs claimed the Constitution of the United States and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 33 a treaty
to which the United States is a party, guaranteed their right to
vote in presidential elections. 34 The complaint also alleged
violations of several other constitutional protections, 35 and asked

individuals who were currently United States citizens and residents of Puerto Rico,
who had never voted in presidential elections, as they had never resided in any of
the several states). The distinction between plaintiffs was for the purpose of
challenging the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff (2001) (Uniform and Overseas
Citizens Absentee Voting Act), which the court dismissed. Plaintiffs also asserted to
represent all other similarly situated persons, without seeking class certification.
32 Compl. 1.
33 See 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (dismissing this part of the claim, the court did not
break with the First Circuit Court of Appeals rationale in Igartua de la Rosa v.
United States, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994), as it did with that court's interpretation of
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution).
34 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140, 141 (D.P.R.
2000). Additionally, the first group of plaintiffs questioned the validity of the
Uniform and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff, which
permits United States citizens, who relocate overseas, to participate in presidential
elections by absentee ballot "in their last state of residence" and does not afford the
same protection to U.S. citizens who move to Puerto Rico as the act expressly
includes Puerto Rico within the United States, thereby disqualifying its residents as
overseas voters. See id. § 1973ff-6.
35 See Compl. at 37-38. The plaintiffs requested the court to declare that the
denial of their right to participate in presidential elections as well as the denial to
all other citizen residents of Puerto Rico:
1) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional protections of these
citizens to vote for their President and Vice President;
2) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of these citizens to
enjoy their [right of] free movement across State lines;
3) denies or abridges the privileges and immunities granted to these
citizens as to all other U.S. citizens under Article IV, Section 2, Clause
1, of the Constitution;
4) may have the impermissible purpose of [or] effect of denying these
citizens the right to vote for President and Vice President because of
the way they may vote;
5) has the effect of denying to these U.S. citizens the equality of civil
rights, and due process and equal protection of the laws that are
guaranteed to them under the Fourteenth Amendment;
6) is in conflict with Defendant's 1952 democratic commitment to all the
American citizens residents of Puerto Rico;
7) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling national
interest in the conduct of presidential elections; and
8) is contrary to the treaty obligations and international policies of
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for a declaration of the rights of the parties, and whatever
equitable relief the court deemed proper.36 The United States
moved to dismiss the complaint based on res judicata and stare
decisis.

37

In ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss, Senior
District Court Judge Jamie Pieras, Jr. issued a detailed opinion
holding that as U.S. citizens, residents of Puerto Rico have a
fundamental right to vote for President because such is a
"function of citizenship." 38 Further, Article II, Section 1 does not
preclude U.S. citizen residents of Puerto Rico from voting in
presidential elections. 39 Rather, that section "merely sets forth
the mechanism by which the right to vote will be implemented in
the states," 40 and has no territorial application. 41 Accordingly,
U.S. citizen residents of Puerto Rico have always had a right of
access to the federal ballot box, 42 despite a "strict reading of
Article II of the Constitution,"43 wich served to bar the exercise
of this right. By holding that "the Constitution itself provides
that right,"44 the court also stated that the right to vote for
President preexisted any requisite constitutional amendment
needed to extend the federal franchise to Puerto Rico. 45
After the ruling on the initial motion, the Governor of Puerto

Defendant applicable to voting rights of its American citizens, and to
promoting democracy, [and] government by consent for citizens of
other countries.
Id.; see also Romeu v. Cohen, 121 F. Supp. 2d 264, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(containing a similar complaint and requesting similar relief).
36 See Compl. at 38-39.
37 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80, 82 (1st Cir. 2000). The
defendant's motion to dismiss claimed the allegations in the instant complaint were
the same as those contained in Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 842 F. Supp.
607 (D.P.R. 1994), affd, 32 F.3d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 1994).
38 Igartuade la Rosa, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 145.
39 See id.
40 Id.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 148.
43 Id. at 144-45 (distinguishing the rationale of the First Circuit Court of
Appeals in Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994), and of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Attorney General of Guam v. United States, 738
F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1984).
4Id.
at 148.
45 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1 (granting electors to the District of
Columbia in an amount not to exceed the amount the least populous State would be
entitled to, and in so doing, enfranchising the citizens of the District of Columbia to
vote in presidential elections).
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Rico, Pedro Rossello, filed a motion to intervene in support of the
plaintiffs, which was granted by the district court. 46 The United
States again defended based on resjudicata and stare decisis, as
in the original motion to dismiss. 47 Additional defenses were also
asserted, including: the plaintiffs lacked standing because their
injuries were not redressable; the matter was a non-justiciable
political question; and plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim
48
upon which relief could be granted.
The district court entered final judgment in the matter and
concluded:
[I]n the land of the free freedom shall prevail, the Court hereby:
1) Finds that the United States Citizens residing in Puerto Rico
have the right to vote in Presidential elections and that its
electoral votes must be counted in Congress;
2) Finds that the Government of Puerto Rico has the obligation
to organize the means by which the United States citizens
residing in Puerto Rico will vote in the upcoming and
subsequent Presidential elections and to provide for the
appointment of Presidential electors and orders the
Government of Puerto Rico to act with all possible expediency
to create such a mechanism;
3) Orders the Government of Puerto Rico to inform the Court of
all developments related to its implementation of the
Presidential vote until the votes are counted pursuant to the
49
Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution.

With this order, the district court swept away the old
barriers that functioned to keep United States citizen residents
46 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 2d. 228, 230 (D.P.R.
2000). The Governor also intervened in an almost simultaneous and similar suit
brought in the Southern District of New York. See Romeu v. Cohen, 121 F. Supp. 2d
264, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
47 See Igartua de la Rosa, 113 F. Supp. 2d. at 230.
48 See id. The defenses raised by the United States

are similar in that

they are

fruit of the same tree, albeit with subtle distinctions. Standing questions the ability
of the plaintiff to bring the claim, whereas the political question doctrine focuses on
the nature of the claim. The political question doctrine prefaces non-justiciability
partly on the inability of a court to fashion a remedy, which is similar to the final
asserted defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciablity and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist
Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 489 (1996) (setting forth the difference between
standing and the political question doctrine and noting the importance of this
distinction in constitutional theory).
49 Id. at 242.
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of Puerto Rico disenfranchised for the purposes of the
presidential election, and ordered Congress to count the electors
appointed in a manner selected by the government of Puerto

Rico. 50
The United States subsequently appealed to the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, which found there was binding
precedent within the circuit. 51 The court took the view that
conditions giving rise to the current litigation were essentially
unchanged since its earlier decision. 52 Moreover, the court held
that the district court failed to sufficiently and properly
distinguish the two cases. 53 As such, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals stood by its earlier ruling and failed to treat the current
litigation substantively.
Consequently, the United States
prevailed and the Government of Puerto Rico was forced to
54
cancel plans for participating in the presidential election.
It is submitted that the district court in Igartua de la Rosa
erred in its legal analysis by: 1) misinterpreting existing case
law regarding the fundamental nature of the right to vote; 2)
incorrectly distinguishing Article II, Section 1 as a mechanism
by which the citizens of the several states express their choice for
President, rather than the constitutionally proscribed method for
presidential selection; and, 3) violating the political question
doctrine by rendering a decision on a non-justiciable political
question. It is further submitted that the First Circuit Court of
50 See id. at 241 ("The court, however, will enter a declaratory judgment in
accordance with this opinion and order that the United States citizens residing in
Puerto Rico may vote in Presidential elections and that their votes must be counted
in Congress.").
51 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80, 85 (1st Cir. 2000).
52 See id. at 83 ("Since our decision in Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32
F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994), Puerto Rico has not become a state, nor has the United States
amended the Constitution to allow United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico to
vote for President .... ").
53 See id. at 84. The court stated,
The district court attempted to distinguish Iguarta I [Iguarta de la Rosa v.
United States, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994)] in its July 19 opinion [Igartua de
la Rosa v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140, 145 (D.P.R. 2000)] (but not
its Final Opinion and Order) on reasoning that while Iguarta I centered on
Plaintiffs inability to vote for the President and Vice President, the instant
case revolves around their inability to elect delegates to the [E]lectoral
[C]ollege. This effort at distinguishing Igartura I obviously fails.
Id.
5 See Igartua de la Rosa, 229 F.3d 80, 83 (explaining how the Legislature of
Puerto Rico enacted a law for the purpose of allowing U.S. citizen residents of
Puerto Rico to vote in the presidential election).
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Appeals erred in its failure to rule on the merits of the case due
to the egregious nature and scope of the error committed by the
district court.
In conclusion, the district court's holding
illustrates a pressing need to resolve both the issue of
presidential voting rights for territorial residents, and the
inconsistency between case holdings declaring the fundamental
nature of the right to vote and strictly reading Article II, Section
1. Such a resolution could be accomplished best by providing for
direct election of the President, with participation prefaced on
U.S. citizenship, rather than on state residency, as in the current
Electoral College system.
Part I of this Comment addresses the errors of the district
court in Igartuade la Rosa with respect to: the misinterpretation
and subsequent misapplication of case law that delineates the
right to vote; the function of Article II, Section 1; and the
political question doctrine. Part II of this Comment examines
the failure of the First Circuit Court of Appeals to address the
fundamentally flawed legal analysis contained in the district
court's opinion.
Part III of this Comment addresses the
fundamental principals expressed by the district court in Igartua
de la Rosa as they illustrate the need to address the inequalities
between citizen residents of the several states and the citizen
residents of the several territories with respect to voting rights
as justification for the suggested remedy. In this regard, the
holding of the district court in Igartua de la Rosa remains vital
well beyond its reversal by the First Circuit Court of Appeals,
and the principles espoused in it must not be obscured by an
erroneous legal rational.
I.
A.

THE ERRONEOUS RULING BY THE DISTRICT COURT

Case Law Delineatingthe Right to Vote

The Constitution of the United States does not expressly
grant United States citizens the right to vote. 55 As with the
right to privacy, 56 the right to free movement,5 7 and the right of a
55 See James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the ConstitutionalStructure
of PoliticalInfluence: A Reconsiderationof the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893,

962 (1997) (stating that although the right to vote receives constitutional protection,
"there is no substantive constitutional right to vote for any state or federal office").
56 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1964) (deriving the right
to privacy from the "penumbra" of rights expressly afforded by the Constitution).
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parent to raise one's child without undue interference from the
state, 58 the right to vote has an amorphous and unspecified
origin. 59 Rather than grant the right to individual citizens, the
Constitution protects the rights of individual citizens to exercise
the franchise in two ways. First, the Constitution prohibits the
traditional exclusion of certain groups from participation in the
electoral process. 60
Second, the Constitution guarantees,
through the doctrine of equal protection, the right of any
qualified citizen to vote with all other qualified citizens, 6 ' to have
his or her vote counted, 62 and have his or her vote afforded equal
weight with all other legally cast votes. 63 Consequently, the
denial of the right to vote has been recognized as effectuated by
both debasement through improper apportionment and outright
denial of exercise of the franchise.6 4 Thus, it is the guarantee of
equal protection afforded the individual citizen that makes the
57 See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 47 (1867) (indicating that the right to
free movement is rooted in federalism); see also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125
(1957) (declaring the right to travel is part of the liberty interest protected by the
Fifth Amendment).
58 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923) (recognizing that the
right to raise children is part of the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
59 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 82-83 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[The right to vote in state elections has itself never been
accorded the stature of an independent constitutional guarantee.").
60 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."); see also id. amend. XIX, §
1 ("MThe right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or any State on account of sex."). Arguably, these amendments
have principles of equal protection as their roots.
61 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (recognizing the
Constitutional Protection of all qualified citizens' right to vote).
62 See id. at 555 (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941))
(defining the right to vote as "the right of qualified voters within a state to cast their
ballots and have them counted") As Justice Douglas stated:
There is more to the right to vote than the right to mark a piece of paper
and drop it in a box or the right to pull a lever in a voting booth. The right
to vote includes the right to have the ballot counted .... It also includes
the right to have the vote counted at full value without dilution or
discount.
South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
6 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 34 n.74 (1973) (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 336 (1972)) ("[T]he Court has made clear that a citizen has a
constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with
other citizens in the jurisdiction.").
6 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (1964).
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right to vote fundamental, not an inherent quality of that right.65
Despite its fundamental and almost inviolable nature, the
right to vote is not limitless. 66 It has been judicially recognized
that Congress has express constitutional powers to regulate
federal elections. 67 It has also been judicially recognized that the
several states retain powers to regulate state elections. 68 Both
congressional and state regulatory authority is bound by the
terms of the constitutional protections 69 afforded citizens as
amendments. 70
constitutional
in
certain
expressed
Consequently, the right to vote has retained its geographic
foundation, 71 which can be traced to the federal nature of the
65 See Gardner, supranote 55, at 962.

66 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646 (1966) (holding the states
retain the right to proscribe minimal durational residency requirements to prevent
vote fraud provided the statutes are narrowly proscribed to meet the state
objective).
67 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970) ("Congress can fix the
age of voters in national elections, such as congressional, senatorial, vicepresidential and presidential elections, but cannot set the voting age in state and
local elections.").
The Times, Places and Manner of holding elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be proscribed in each state by the legislature
thereof, but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators of Congressional
power to regulate federal elections is rooted in Article I, Section 4 of the
U.S. Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. It can be argued this congressional power, in conjunction
with that conferred by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (Necessary and Proper Clause)
received a liberal interpretation by the court in an effort to breath life into
legislation such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965), which
was enacted in the face of fierce opposition as to what was perceived by many as
encroachment into an area of authority retained by the several states. See, e.g.,
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
68 See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 118 (holding the federal government could not force
the states to adopt "the 18 year old vote provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1970"
for the purposes of state elections).
69 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648 ("[T]he States have no power to grant or
withhold the franchise on conditions that are forbidden by the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
70 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections 383 U.S. 663, 672 (1965)
(holding the Equal Protection Clause forbids certain state legislation restricting the
right to vote); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1966).
71 But see Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) (holding unconstitutional a
Maryland law that disenfranchised Maryland residents living on the grounds of the
National Institute of Health once the grounds were ceded to the federal government
by the state of Maryland). This case seemed to disregard venue, in that the grounds
became federal property and, technically, no longer a part of the state of Maryland.
The court however, recognized that such hyper-technical readings were not valid,
and as a result, the state statute was struck down. The district court in Igartua de
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republic. As such, the political status of the venue remains a
72
viable constraint upon th6 scope of the right to vote.
The Igartuade la Rosa court erred by maintaining the right
to vote was afforded by the Constitution rather than protected by
the Constitution, 73 and by relying on the "evolution of
constitutional thought" regarding the right,7 4 as well as the
bilateral nature of a representative government, 75 rather than
relying upon constitutional and legal principles. 76 The court
cited instances where the Constitution had to be amended in
order to adapt to the changing societal view as to whom the right
should apply,77 yet failed to recognize that these amendments
extended protection of the franchise to certain un-enfranchised
groups7 8 and extended the franchise itself to populations
previously excluded by operation of the Constitution.7 9 In so
la Rosa misconstrued this fact-specific case to stand for the general proposition that
"territoriality is not determinative of a citizen's right to vote in the elections that
affect him or her." Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 2d 228, 233
(D.P.R. 2000).
72 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140, 142 (D.P.R.
2000) (citing Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)) (holding the rights
that accompany American citizenship are a function of the political status of the
venue in question). Balzac is also referenced as included in the "Insular Cases,"
which defined the extent to which the U.S. Constitution "followed the flag" as the
United States acquired an overseas colonial empire resulting from the Spanish
American War of 1898.
73 See Igartuade la Rosa, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 148. But see Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 554, 554 (1964) (stating "the Constitution of the United States protects the
right of all qualified citizens to vote in state as well as federal elections"). It must be
stated there is a fundamental difference in "protect" and provide" that goes beyond
mere semantics. Moreover, the court in Igartua de la Rosa failed to consider
"qualified" as it modifies "citizen." It can be argued this language recognizes certain,
although unexpressed restrictions, on the right to vote regardless of citizenship. The
U.S. citizen residents of Puerto Rico are not qualified by reason of the restrictions
placed upon them by the political status of Puerto Rico, a fact the district court
recognized, yet discounted. See Igartuade laRosa, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 148.
74 Igartua de la Rosa, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 147-48 ("The court finds that the
evolution of constitutional thought can only lead to the inevitable conclusion that
United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico have always had the right to enter
the ballot box.").
75 See id. at 147 ("The United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico are subject
to the laws of the United States and therefore have a vested interest in
participating in Presidential elections.").
76 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
77 See Igartuade la Rosa, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 145-46.
78 See U.S. CONST. amend. X1V (granting the right to vote to those previously
held in a condition of servitude).
79 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII (granting the District of Columbia the right to
appoint, in a manner to be determined by Congress, electors equal to the entire
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doing, the court discounted the purpose of, 80 and need for the
Twenty-Third Amendment, 8 ' which gave the citizens of the
District of Columbia the right to vote in the presidential
82
elections.
Significantly, the court's interpretation of the right to vote
as a function of the "bilateral nature of a representative
government"8 3 assumes the extension of voting rights to be
germane to that relationship.8 4 With this assumption, the court
ignored the fact that the representative government of the
United States was established without granting its citizens the
number that it would be entitled to if it were a state, but "in no event more than the
least populous state" for the purposes of presidential elections).
80 See H.R. REP. No. 86-1698 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C-A.N. 1459, 1460
('The purpose of this proposed constitutional amendment is to provide the citizens
of the District of Colombia with appropriate rights of voting in national elections for
President and Vice President of the United States.").
81 See Igartua de la Rosa, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 148 (adopting the underlying
arguments supporting the Twenty-Third Amendment. The court analogized the
duties of citizenship and significant sacrifices of U.S. citizen residents of Puerto Rico
made on the nation's battlefields to those of the residents of the District of
Columbia, which were used as justification for the Twenty Third Amendment); see
also H.R. REP. No. 86-1698 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1459, 1460
('They have fought and died in every U.S. war since the District was founded.").
Although the analogy strongly supports a similar extension of presidential voting
rights to U.S. citizen residents of Puerto Rico, the court chose to embrace the
underlying rationale and not the legal reasoning necessitating an amendment.
82 See H.R. REP. No. 86-1698 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1459,
1460.
[V]oting rights are denied District citizens because the Constitution
provides machinery only through the states for the selection of the
President and Vice President. In fact, all national elections including those
for Senators and Representatives are stated in terms of the States. Since
the District is not a State or a part of a State, there is no machinery
through which its citizens may participate in such matters. It should be
noted that, apart form the Thirteen Original States, the only areas which
have achieved national voting rights have done so by becoming States as a
result of the exercise by the Congress of its powers to create new States
pursuant to article IV, section 3, clause 1 of the Constitution.
Id.
83 Igartua de la Rosa, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 146 (expressing a social compact or
contractual approach to the relationship between a state and its citizens).
84 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) ("[TIhe right to vote is not a
natural right, but a political one, granted by society according to its will, under
certain conditions, nevertheless it is regarded as a fundamental political right,
because it is preservative of all other rights."). The assumption by the district court
in Igartua de la Rosa ignores the recognition inherent in Yick Wo that granting the
right to vote is a volitional act on the part of a society, rather than an innate aspect
of the "benefit of the bargain" gained by those entering into an arrangement of
representative government.
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right to vote for its chief executive,8 5 except to the extent that it
was provided for by a state legislature.8 6 The court failed to
distinguish or recognize that the extent of the right to vote
remains contingent upon constitutional provisions,8 7 principles of
federalism,8 8 and the separation of powers, which were an
essential part of the founding of the republic. By relying on "the
evolution of constitutional thought,"8 9 the court failed to
recognize that this evolution had not yet reached those with the
means necessary to effect change for the U.S. citizen residents of
Puerto Rico. 90 Moreover, the district court's flawed analysis of
the right to vote manifested itself into an equally flawed analysis
of the function of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution of the
United States.
B.

The ConstitutionalDimensions of the Right to Vote For
President
Article

II of the Constitution

of the United

States

85 See H.R. REP. No. 86-1698 (1960), reprintedin 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1459, 1460
(noting the language speaks of "areas which have achieved national voting rights"
rather than citizens).
86 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Placing the presidential selection process in the
Constitution resulted in preventing any substantive change in the process through
the normal actions of any coordinate branches of government, and served to insure
stability by necessitating an overt textual change of the Constitution as provided for
by Article V. By placing the authority to alter the Constitution in either a two-thirds
majority of both houses of Congress and subsequent approval of a supermajority of
three-fourths of the state legislatures, or approval of a supermajority of threefourths of the state legislatures to call a constitutional convention, the judiciary is
relegated to a reactionary role through judicial review of any action, provided a
challenge is presented within the parameters of Article III. The holding of the
district court in Igartua de la Rosa effectively makes the judiciary proactive, as the
remedy provided plaintiffs ignored the need to alter the text of the Constitution and
effectively rendered the constitutionally proscribed role of the other coordinate
branches of the federal government superfluous.
87 See U.S. CONST. art. IX,§ 1.

88 See id. (noting that the distribution of the power to choose the chief executive
to the states reflects the federal nature of the republic and the concept of a limited
national authority, with individual states retaining certain powers reserved as a
function of their individual sovereignty as well as a mechanism to control the power
of the national authority).
89 Igartuade la Rosa, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 148. In this instance, the evolution of
constitutional thought has collided with viable provisions of the Constitution that
must be overridden in accordance with the terms of Article V, or there is the
appearance of holding certain parts of the Constitution unconstitutional when
examined from the new perspective gained from "the evolution of constitutional
thought."
90 See U.S. CONST. art V.
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establishes the office of President and Vice President of the
United States. It proscribes concurrent terms of four years for
both officers and the manner in which they are to be chosen. 9 '
The specific procedures for presidential and vice presidential
elections are set forth as follows:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a number of Electors, equal to the whole
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State
may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit
under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector. 92
The electors, as chosen, then meet in the several states to
vote by ballot for representatives to fill the respective offices.9 3
Once the votes are cast in the states, the ballots are tallied and
"transmit[ted] sealed to the Seat of the Government of the
United States, directed to the President of the Senate."9 4 The
President of the Senate, in the presence of the House of
Representatives, counts the ballots and certifies a winner.95
Article II, Section 1, Clause 3 includes provisions for breaking a
tie by a vote of the states in the House of Representatives, with
each state delegation having one vote, as well as tie breaking
provisions by the Senate, in case of a tie in the House of
Representatives.9 6 Article II also gives Congress the right to
determine the time of choosing electors, and the day they report
their votes, provided the day is the same throughout the United
97
States.

91 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
92 Id. cl. 2; see also 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (containing statutory provisions
effectuating the terms of article II).
93 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. Prior to passage of the Twelfth Amendment,
the electors voted for two persons, and at least one could not be an inhabitant of
their state. A tally was taken, recorded, and transmitted to the President of the
Senate, who in front of the House of Representatives would count the ballots,
certifying the winner as President and the second place finisher as Vice President.
The Twelfth Amendment provided for two distinct votes by each elector, with one
ballot cast for a person to be President and a second ballot cast for a person to be
vice president. For a concise analysis of the impact of the Twelfth Amendment upon
the presidential selection process, see JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
94 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.

95 See id.
96 See id.
97 See id.

§ 264 (ed. 1887).
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The Judicial Interpretation of Article II, Section 1
In creating the Electoral College, 98 Article II, Section 1 gives
the right to appoint Electors for the purpose of choosing the
President and Vice President to the legislatures of the several
states. 99 As such, these legislatures have broad discretion in
choosing the manner in which the Electors are selected. 10 0 The
Constitution "recognizes that the people act through their
representatives in the legislature, and leaves it to the legislature
exclusively to define the method of effecting the object." 1 1
in
Recognized as plenary, 10 2 state authority to "appoint [electors]
10 3 is
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,"
10 4
restricted by bounds set by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Moreover, despite controlling state authority, 10 5 the electors
10 6
retain constitutional discretion to vote for any candidate.
1.

98 See James M. Rose, The Electoral College: One Person No Vote? 23
WESTCHESTER B.J. 71 (1996) (describing the origin of the use of the term "Electoral
College").
99 See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224 n.11 (1952) (citing McPherson v. Blacker,
146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892)). McPherson is the seminal case regarding the power of the
state legislatures with respect to the appointment of electors and was conspicuously
absent from the district court's analysis of the function of Article II, Section 1.
100 See McPherson, 146 U.S. at 28-29 (1892).
[01n reference to contemporaneous and subsequent action under the
clause, we should expect to find, as we do, that various modes of choosing
the electors were pursued, as, by the legislature itself on joint ballot; by the
legislature through a concurrent vote of the two houses; by vote of the
people for a general ticket; by vote of the people in districts; by choice
partly by the people voting in districts and partly by the legislature; by
choice by the legislature from candidates voted for by the people in
districts; and in other ways.
Id.
101 Id. at 27 (1892).
102 See id. at 35 (opining that the practical construction of the clause has
conceded plenary power to the state legislatures in the matter of the appointment of
electors).
103 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
104See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
105 Currently, either state law or pledges to a political party to vote for a
particular candidate, do not bind the electors of twenty-five states. Moreover, state
laws that do bind electors are constitutionally suspect. See Ray v. Blair 343 U.S.
214, 224-25 (1952). What binds the electors is only party loyalty and tradition.
Significantly, the remedy for a faithless elector is not to discount that vote in
Congress. See Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and the
PopularVote, 12 J.L. & POL. 665, 732 (1996).
106 See Blair, 343 U.S. at 231 (holding a pledge on the part of a candidate for
elector in a state party primary to support the party candidate should his particular
candidate lose constitutional).
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Despite these constitutional limitations, the right to appoint
electors to choose the President remains with the several states,
and the people, through the legislative grace of their respective
states, thereby exercise their right to vote in the presidential
election.10 7 A United States citizen's right to vote for President
remains unmistakably dependent upon, and is exercised
through, residence in a particular state.
2.

Article II as Interpreted by the Igartuade la Rosa court

The Igartua de la Rosa court dismissed the express
provisions of Article II as they "merely set ...forth the
mechanism by which the right to vote [for President] is
implemented in the states." 0 8 Specifically, the court dismissed
the applicability of Article II to Puerto Rico because it "speaks to
the way in which residents of the states participate in
Presidential elections," 10 9 but it does not "preclude United States
citizens in Puerto Rico from voting in Presidential elections." 110
Since Puerto Rico is not a state, but rather "an unincorporated
territory belonging to the Union, its residents would not
participate in Presidential elections pursuant to that
constitutional clause.""' Dismissing the clause as "the logistics
by which the electors of the states elect the President and Vice
President," 112 the court declared that "[t]he right to vote is a
function of citizenship and a fundamental right preservative of
all other rights."113 In so holding, the court opened the federal
poll for those disenfranchised U.S. citizen residents of Puerto
Rico, and proclaimed the right to vote for President to be
guaranteed by the Constitution, 114 rather than limited by the
express terms of Article II, Section 1.

107 See McPherson, 146 U.S. 1 at 27 (recognizing that the Constitution enables
people to act through their representatives in the legislature).
108 Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140, 145 (D.P.R. 2000).

109 Id.
110

Id.

111 Id.
112

Id.

113 Id.
114 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D.P.R. 2000).
The court also cited those "principles entrenched in the Bill of Rights," as well as the
Ninth Amendment's protection of unenumerated rights. See id. at 232-35.
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The Flawed Analysis of Article II Presented in Igartua de la
Rosa
In distinguishing Article II as a mechanism by which the
right to vote is implemented in the states, the court failed to
recognize that Article II gives the right to select the President to
the several states, and not to the citizenry of the several
states." 5 The terms do not create a mechanism, nor do they
express a mere logistical scheme used to express the popular
11 6
choice of the citizenry. To dismiss them as such is erroneous.
Only the electors of the several states possess the legal ability to
choose the President,"z7 and despite state law binding them in
several of the states to vote for the candidate to whom they are
pledged, they remain constitutionally free to vote as they
choose." 8 The popular choice of the citizenry is an irrelevancy,
unless granted relevancy through actions of a state
legislature." 9 As such, the citizen's right to vote for President
exists only to the extent that it is provided for by the state
Without authority to appoint electors, the
legislatures. 2 0
3.

115 See id. at 232 ("[A] U.S. citizen and stateside resident's right to vote in
Presidential elections is not derived from Article II, section 1, clause 2... but
rather arises from the principals entrenched in the Bill of Rights."). But see Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) ("The individual citizen has no federal constitutional
right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the
state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power
to appoint members of the Electoral College.").
116 See, e.g., Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 231 (1952) (standing for the proposition
that electors can pledge to vote for a particular candidate or the candidate of a party
without interfering with an elector's constitutional freedom).
137 See In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890) ("The sole function of the
presidential electors is to cast, certify and transmit the vote of the State for
President and Vice President of the nation.").
11s See Blair, 343 U.S. at 220 n.4.
119 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (declaring that the individual citizen has no
federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President, unless and until
the State legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its
power to appoint members of the Electoral College).
120 See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1892) (citing S. REP. No. 43395).
The appointment of these electors is thus placed absolutely and wholly
with the legislatures of the several States. They may be chosen by the
legislature, or the legislature may provide they shall be elected by the
people of the State at large, or in districts, as are members of Congress,
which was the case formerly in many States; and it is, no doubt, competent
for the legislature to authorize the governor or the Supreme Court of the
State, or any other agent of its will, to appoint these electors. The power is
conferred upon the legislatures of the States by the Constitution of the
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government of Puerto Rico is without power to extend the right
to participate in presidential elections to its citizenry 121 as is a
federal court. Moreover, for a court to do so is violative of the
political question doctrine.
C.

The PoliticalQuestion Doctrine
In considering the issue of non-justiciability, the court's
analysis is not immediately precluded, but "necessarily proceeds
to the point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be
judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and
whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially
molded."122 Consequently, "[tlhe political question doctrine does
not deprive courts of jurisdiction over a case."1 23 Rather, "it
precludes courts from granting relief that would violate the
separation of powers mandated by the United States
Constitution."'124
In defining an analytical framework for
delineating a non-justiciable political question, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
United States, and cannot be taken from them or modified by their State
constitutions any more than can their power to elect Senators of the
United States. Whatever provisions may be made by statute, or by the
state constitution, to choose electors by the people, there is no doubt of the
right of the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it can neither
be taken away or abdicated.
Id. The action by the Florida legislature to appoint a slate of electors when the
results of the November 2000 election were contested and threatened to
disenfranchise the state in the Electoral College illustrates the plenary powers of
state legislature to choose the manner in which a state's electors are chosen. The
legislative action in Florida was inchoate and rendered moot by the decision in Bush
and most certainly would have been subjected to a court challenge. See Bush, 531
U.S. at 110.
121 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting
that only a constitutional amendment or grant of statehood to Puerto Rico could
provide people with the right to vote in presidential elections).
122 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
123 Brown v. Hansen, 973 F.2d 1118, 1121 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516 (1968)).
124 Brown, 973 F.2d at 1121 (citing Powell, 395 U.S. at 517).
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resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality
of
embarrassment
from
multifarious
125
pronouncements by various departments on one question.

Absent a finding that one of these "formulations is
inextricable" from the issue presented, a case involving the
presence of a political question should not be dismissed as nonjusticiable. 126 Moreover, if the essence of a claim is that of a
political question, characterizing it as a deprivation of some
other constitutional right does not render it any less of a political
question. 2 7
The issue presented in Igartua de la Rosa is essentially a
non-justiciable political question as measured by the contours of
the political question doctrine, 128 and the court erred in not
recognizing and treating the issue as such. 29 Granting the
requested relief could not be judicially molded without violating
the separation of powers doctrine.130 This becomes manifest
when the relief granted by the district court is given careful
scrutiny. Although the court recognized the political nature of
the case,' 3 ' it failed to recognize and consider several of the
125
126

127

Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.

Id.
See id. at 228.

128 Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 842 F. Supp. 607, 609-11 (D.P.R. 1994)
(holding a determination of whether Puerto Rico is a "de facto" state is
fundamentally a political question inappropriate for judicial resolution). In the
earlier litigation, plaintiff sought the right to vote for President as remedy for
alleged deprivation of his right to vote. In the instant matter, the requested relief is
fundamentally the same, although the complaint alleges other deprivations of
constitutionally protected rights and seeks the appointment of electors.
129 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.P.R. 2000).
130 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (citing United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941)) ("Obviously included within the right to choose,
secured by the Constitution, is the right of qualified voters within a state to cast
their ballots and to have them counted."). When the right to vote is seen in its
totality, the court is clearly without power to create a remedy to vindicate the right,
given the terms of Article I, Section 1, as well as the commitment to Congress of
the authority to certify and count electoral votes.
131 See Igartua de la Rosa, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 148.
What has stood in the way of the U.S. citizens living in Puerto Rico from
reaching the ballot box, however, is the incompatibility of Puerto Rico's
[political] status with the Constitution... [ulltimately it is this political
conundrum that has characterized the present status of Puerto Rico: a
status of subordination through disenfranchisement.

530
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formulations held to be prominent when presented with a
political question issue. 132 Such formulations were manifest in
Igartua de la Rosa, and the court consequently erred by
propounding the existence of a right it is without power to
133
vindicate.
Specifically, there is a textually demonstrable grant of
authority to Congress to admit new states into the union,13 and
thereby giving Congress the only express authority to extend the
federal franchise without constitutional amendment. Contrary
to this express grant of authority, the court declared U.S.
citizens residing in Puerto Rico to have a right reserved by the
Constitution to the several states based on residency within such
a state. 135 There is also a textually demonstrable constitutional
grant of authority to Congress to enact the rules and regulations
required to govern the territories belonging to the United
States. 36 Judicially mandated participation in presidential
elections by U.S. citizen residents of Puerto Rico conflicts with
powers granted to Congress by the Territory Clause and violates
the separation of powers doctrine.
There is also a manifest need for an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion, as the
history of Puerto Rico shows no clear manifestation on the part
of its citizenry to join the Union and thereby to participate in
presidential elections. 137 The issue presented in Igartua de la
Rosa is inextricably intertwined with the political question
presented by the territorial status of Puerto Rico. 138 Moreover,
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
See id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union ... .
135 See id. art. II, § 1; see also Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10
(1st Cir. 1994).
136 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
property belonging to the United States .... "). As Puerto Rico is an "unincorporated
territory belonging to the United States," the clause maintains contemporary
applicability. Igartua de la Rosa, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 143 (citing Harris v. Rosario
446 U.S. 651 (1980)).
137 The political history of twentieth century Puerto Rico appears to be littered
with inconclusive votes and referendum on the question of the political status of
Puerto Rico. See, e.g., S. Res. 472, 105th Cong. (1997) ("To provide for referenda in
which the residents of Puerto Rico may express democratically their preferences
regarding the political status of the territory, and for other purposes.").
138See Igartuade la Rosa, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 140.
132

133
134
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on the face of the decision was an obvious risk of the
embarrassment of multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question, which became a reality when, on
the basis of this decision, the Congress of Puerto Rico passed
legislation authorizing the printing of and casting of ballots in
the 2000 presidential election, without a means to have them
included in the national total. 139 Finally, the district court
showed a manifest lack of respect due Congress, given that
institution's constitutional role in the presidential selection
process. 140 Because of the inextricable nature of the political
question surrounding the legal status of Puerto Rico with the
complaint in Igartua de la Rosa, the court was without power to
grant the requested relief, and erred when it attempted to do
so. 141 Moreover, this should have been recognized on appeal, and
the failure to do so constitutes a second, compounding error.
II. THE ERRONEOUS RULING BY THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS
The First Circuit Court of Appeals erred by not ruling on the
merits of the district court's ruling in Igartua de la Rosa, given
the nature and magnitude of the district court's flawed legal
analysis. The district court's interpretation of both the right to
vote and the function of Article II, Section 1 were so contrary to
accepted legal doctrine, that the court should have addressed
and discounted the rationale. Moreover, the district court's final
order and opinion clearly showed through the remedial
provisions it contained that the issue in Igartuade la Rosa was a
139 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2000)
(explaining how the Legislature of Puerto Rico enacted a law for the purpose of
allowing U.S. citizen residents of Puerto Rico to vote in the presidential election, but
failed to provide a means for the results to be included in the national total of the
electoral votes that elect the President). The court holding is inconsistent with the
present position of Congress that does not recognize Puerto Rico as a state.
140 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 2d 228, 240-42 (D.P.R.
2000) (treating the issue of the district court's ability to issue an injunction against
Congress in order to force the counting of the Electors from Puerto Rico appointed
as a result of the court's final order).
141 See Igartua de la Rosa, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 148 ("What has stood in the way
of the U.S. citizens living in Puerto Rico from reaching the ballot box, however, is
the incompatibility of Puerto Rico's status with the Constitution."). This status is
the "crux" of the complaint, not "whether the inability of United States citizens
residing in Puerto Rico to vote in presidential elections is unconstitutional" as the
court maintains. Id. at 144.
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non-justiciable political question, 142 as it was when the issue was
presented in the First Circuit in 1994.143 Rather than address
the merits presented in the second litigation, the Court of
Appeals rested on its earlier decision, which correctly interpreted
Article II, Section 1, but failed to properly address the question
at issue in the context of the political question doctrine.'"
The failure to recognize the non-justiciability of the issue in
1994 predicated the subsequent litigation. The plaintiffs had no
choice but to bring the litigation given the detestable unfairness
and continuing injustice of keeping U.S. citizen residents of
Puerto Rico un-enfranchised. 145 The distinction drawn by the
plaintiffs and recognized by the district court is entirely logical,
given the earlier holding. 46 The two cases presented different
issues, but the relief requested was effectively the same. It is
the inability of the judiciary to supply the requested relief in
both instances that makes both questions non-justiciable. The
Court of Appeals rested on resjudicataand stare decisis, without
hearing the merits of the case. As a result, it missed the
142 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80, 88 (1st Cir. 2000)
(Torruella, J., concurring) ('Che present conundrum cannot be justified or
perpetuated further under the subterfuge of labeling it a 'political question.' "). In
recognizing and refusing to label the issue a non-justiciable political question, the
judge's eloquent dissent states that "the particular issue of the presidential vote is
governed by explicit language in the Constitution providing for the election of the
President and Vice President by the states, rather than by individual citizens." Id.
at 90. Recognition that the power to provide the plaintiffs with their requested relief
was reserved to Congress would have properly completed the analysis.
143 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994).
144 See id. at 9.
345 See Igartua de la Rosa, 229 F.3d at 90 (Torruella, J., concurring) (calling the
un-enfranchisement "an outrageous disregard for the rights of a substantial
segment of its citizenry"). The unexhausting nature of the lead plaintiff is manifest,
and one would presume that if he is clever enough to raise the issue twice, the
matter could be brought up again, albeit in a different context. See, e.g., Romeu v.
Cohen, 121 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding a New York citizen who moved
to Puerto Rico was not entitled to vote by absentee ballot under the Uniformed and
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act).
146 See Igartua de la Rosa, 229 F.3d at 82. The justiciability of the claim based
on the political question doctrine was not addressed in the final decision, as it had
been in the district court. See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 842 F. Supp. 607,
609-10 (D.P.R. 1994). In a real sense, the court misinterpreted the nature of the
plaintiffs' question, which centered entitlement to voting rights for U.S. citizen
residents of Puerto Rico on a claim of de facto statehood, rather than simply the
individual citizen's right to vote for President. In doing so, the court missed an
essential nuance presented by the case, and effectively rendered an advisory
opinion, rather than effectively settling the matter with an application of the
political question doctrine.
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opportunity to state clearly that the courts were not the proper
forum for redress, and thus shift the focus of the matter to the
proper governmental institution.
III. BEYOND THE LEGAL: THE REAL MESSAGE OF IGARTUA DE LA
ROSA
The importance of the Igartua de la Rosa decision rests not
in its immediate holding, but rather in the values and principals
embodied in it' 47 as well as its potential catalytic effect on the
presidential election process. The decision rejects the manifest
inequality
established
and
perpetuated
by American
jurisprudence as reflected in voting rights. 148 The decision
highlighted a perceived inconsistency between the fundamental
nature of the right to vote and Article II, Section 1 of the
Constitution. This, coupled with the systemic deficiencies of the
electoral process illustrated by the presidential election of 2000,
effectively point toward a constitutional amendment eliminating
the Electoral College as a remedy for the un-enfranchised status
of U.S. citizen residents of the several territories. 149 Removing
this vestige and establishing a direct vote for President based on
citizenship status rather than the political status of one's
residence, would end voting disparity. Furthermore, it would
resolve the inconsistency between the judicial interpretation of
the fundamental nature of the right to vote and Article II,
Section 1.
A.

The Historic Underpinningsof TerritorialInequality: The
Insular Cases
The Spanish Empire ceded Puerto Rico, the Island of Guam,
and the Philippine Archipelago to the United States after losing
147 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140, 141 (D.P.R.
2000). The court stated:
The present political status of Puerto Rico has enslaved the United States
citizens residing in Puerto Rico by preventing them from voting in
Presidential and Congressional elections and therefore is abhorrent to the
most sacred of the basic safeguards contained in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution of the United States-freedom.

Id.
148

See id. at 149-50.

149 See id. (interpreting Article H, Section 1, as a barrier to territorial resident

citizens exercising the federal franchise, but not questioning its validity as applied
to the several states).
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the Spanish American War of 1898.150 Relative to other United
States citizens, inequality quickly attached to the inhabitants of
Puerto Rico. 151 The likely cause was a combination of scholarly
debate, 152 specific acts of the U.S. government, 153 and a series of
Supreme Court cases decided beginning in 1901. Known as the
Insular Cases, 5 4 these nine decisions' 55 resulted in a delineation
150 See Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom

of Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754 (noting the treaty is commonly referred to as
the Treaty of Paris); see also Igartua de la Rosa, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 142. In addition
to the territorial acquisitions, the United States established a protectorate over
Cuba, where a rebellion against Spanish authority, the destruction of the U.S.
battleship Maine in Havana Harbor, and the consequential screaming headlines of
hideous horror in newspapers, all served to precipitate the war.
151 See generally Gabriel A. Terrasa, The United States, Puerto Rico and the
Territorial Incorporation Doctrine: Reaching a Century of Constitutional
Authoritarianism 31 J.

MARSHALL L. REV. 55 (1997).

Geopolitical concerns

regarding defense of the Panama Canal, racism, as well as the overall imperialist
swagger with which the industrialized nations carried themselves at the time,
resulted in the retention of Puerto Rico by the United States as a territory, rather
than receiving a grant of independence that was immediately assumed to be the
destiny for both the Philippines and Cuba. Other considerations against
independence for Puerto Rico included the size of the island. See id.
152 See id. at n.34.
The academic debate.., developed three different views:
1) The Constitution applied to the Territories ex propio vigore and
Congress therefore lacked the power to permanently hold territories
without annexing them into the Union, 2) The Constitution only applied to
States and thus Congress had plenary power over the Territories, 3) The
document effecting the transfer of sovereignty over a Territory determined
whether the Constitution applied to the acquired Territory (the
"incorporation theory").
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
153 See, e.g., Foraker Act, 31 Stat. 77 (codified as amended 48 U.S.C. §§ 733,
736, 738-40, 744, 864 (2000) (establishing a civil government for Puerto Rico and
ending a two year military occupation)); see also Jones Act, ch. 190, 39 Stat. 951
(1917) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 731 (1987)) (granting U.S. citizenship to the
inhabitants of Puerto Rico); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) (holding Congress
could rescind any grant of citizenship granted by statute). The grant of citizenship
to residents of Puerto Rico is statutory rather than Constitutional. This is also true
for residents of the several states who are defined to be citizens in the Fourteenth
Amendment.
154 See, e.g., De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetz v. United States, 182
U.S. 221 (1901); Crossman v. United Sates, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United
States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huss v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co.,
182 U.S. 392 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Fourteen
Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); see also Ediberto Roman, The
Alien-Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S. Colonialism, 26 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1, n.74. (1998).
155 See Efren Riveria Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism:
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535

as to which constitutional rights were applicable to the
inhabitants of U.S. Flag Territories. 15 6
The Territorial
Incorporation Doctrine 157 was a product of, and rationale for, the
various holdings of the Insular Cases. 15 Under this doctrine, 5 9
Congress, through its power to regulate the Territories belonging
to the United States, was able to disparately treat the U.S.
160
citizen residents of Puerto Rico.
The Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225, 240-41 (1996). Thirteen
additional Supreme Court cases decided between 1903 and 1914 can arguably be
included with the Insular Cases because of their subject matter. See Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Ochoa v.
Hernandez, 230 U.S. 139 (1913); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911);
Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468 (1909); Kent v. Porto Rico, 207 U.S. 113 (1907);
Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521
(1905); Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Mendezona v. United
States, 195 U.S. 158 (1904); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904); Hawaii
v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
156 See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 268 (1901) (stating that Congress,
as a result of Article VI, Section I, had plenary powers over the territories subject to
"fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights"). The Court also noted that
there was an undefined spectrum of personal rights to which limitations might
apply. See id. Moreover, it is arguable that the right to vote is not a personal one,
but a political one that would conceivably fall outside the spectrum of protected
personal rights. See id; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
157 See Downes, 182 U.S. 244 at 289-90 (White, J., concurring) (concurring with
the rationale that Congress was limited in its capacity to legislate for the territories
by applicable portions of the Constitution). Which particular provisions applied
were a function of "the situation of the territory and its relations to the United
States." Id. at 293. In his concurrence, Justice White stated that Congress had,
through its power to make war and treaties, the power to acquire new territories.
The decision on whether to incorporate these new territories into the union was not
the automatic end of acquiring territory, but rather a volitional decision on the part
of Congress to share with "the alien people" the "rights which peculiarly belong to
the citizens of the United States." Id. at 324. Stating that there had been no
intention to incorporate the territory of Puerto Rico into the United States, Justice
White believed Congress retained the right to determine the status of Puerto Rico
and the rights of its inhabitants. See id. at 339-40.
158 See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904) (establishing the
territorial incorporation doctrine as the majority position of the Court).
159 See Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United
States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REv. 445, 449 (1992)
(dividing possible political status among U.S. possessions as either incorporatedmeaning the territory is slated for acceptance into the union as a state, in which
case the provisions of the Constitution are fully applicable; or unincorporatedmeaning the territory is not slated for acceptance into the union as a state and
Congress retains the power to determine which constitutional provisions apply).
Puerto Rico, Guam, Northern Marianas Islands and American Samoa are
considered to be unincorporated territories. See id. at 450.
160 See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). (holding the rights
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The InsularCases in ContemporaryAmerican Jurisprudence

Despite a fundamental change in the political relationship
between the United States and Puerto Rico in 1950,161 the
rationale of the Insular Cases remains a part of contemporary
American jurisprudence. In 1951, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the Territorial Incorporation Doctrine and held certain
constitutional protections were not applicable to the
territories. 162 The Court has reaffirmed that Congress, through
the Territory Clause, controls the relationship between the
United States and Puerto Rico. It has held only fundamental
constitutional rights apply to the territories. 1 The rationale of
the Insular Cases also serves as the basis for disparate
treatment for U.S. citizen residents of Puerto Rico in relation to
certain government economic benefits. 164 The continued viability
of the holdings in the Insular Cases serves to perpetuate a
perverse colonial system that subjugates its own citizens.

accompanying American citizenship are a function of political status, the Supreme
Court effectively gutted the statutory grant of citizenship provided to the residents
of Puerto Rico embodied in the Jones Act, ch. 190, 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (codified at 48
U.S.C. § 731 (2001)) by linking citizenship to venue; thereby creating degrees of
citizenship within the general body of U.S. citizenry).
161 See Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 (1950) (granting "commonwealth"
status to Puerto Rico). For a time there was a divergence of opinion as to whether
this new statute resulted in the end of Congressional power over Puerto Rico under
the Territory Clause. See id.; see also Popular Democratic Party v. Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, 24 F. Supp. 2d 184, 193 (D.P.R. 1998) (citing Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.
2d 377 (1st Cir. 1953)) (stating that by the terms of Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319
(1950), Congress had granted away its plenary powers under the territory clause).
The court in Mejias adopted the "compact theory" which loosely held the compact
between the United States and the people of Puerto Rico altered the basic political
relationship. See Mejias, 206 F.2d at 387-88. The compact theory was short lived.
162 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (relying on cultural differences as
justification for endorsing the continued applicability of the territory incorporation
doctrine).
163 See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 298 (holding that the Fifth Amendment right to a
grand jury indictment and the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury are not
fundamental and therefore do not apply to unincorporated territories).
164 See id. The Court held the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause was
not violated by the lower levels of aid to dependent children (ADC) provided by the
federal government to the residents of Puerto Rico as compared to the residents of
the several states. See id. The Court, reaffirming the validity of Congressional
power over Puerto Rico through the Territory Clause, held the statute should be
reviewed using the rational basis standard rather than a heightened standard of
judicial scrutiny because of Congressional authority to regulate the territories. See
id. at 652.
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C. Challengingthe Rationale of the Insular Cases
An inherent value in the district court holding in Igartua de
la Rosa lies is its rejection of inequality manifest in the authority
of the Insular Cases that evolved into a doctrine of
subjugation. 165 Rather than accepting the rationale justifying
the treatment of U.S. citizen residents of the territories as much
less than citizens, 166 the district court decided the issue in favor
of those individuals who possess an inferior grade of U.S.
citizenship. 16 7 The rationale of the Insular Cases is clearly
inconsistent with contemporary notions of due process and equal
protection.
It serves to subjugate a "discrete and insular
minority."168 It serves as a legal basis for treating a population of
U.S. citizens as less than citizens by affording them only certain
fundamental rights. The district court's opinion strongly asserts
the fundamental values of equality and freedom as basic tenants
of the American political system,169 and, as such, the court
disavowed the validity of a system it finds abhorrent. 7 0
The district court opinion in Igartua de la Rosa illustrates
the need to address and reform this segment of American
political life where colonialism prevails. 1 1 Contemporary
165

See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140, 147 (D.P.R.

2000).

166 See Robert A. Katz, The Jurisprudence of Legitimacy: Applying the
Constitutionto U.S. Territories 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 779, 794-96 (1998).
167 See Nelson D. Hermilla, Puerto Rico 1898-1998: The Institutionalism of
Second Class Citizenship?, 16 DICK. J. INTL L. 257 (1998).
168 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
169 See Igartuade la Rosa, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 145. The court stated:
The United States Constitution forever changed the history of humanity
when it did away with human bondage. It did away with slavery, and in
doing so, vindicated the principle that all men are created equal. The
inability to vote represents a form of slavery, as it subordinates the will of
the people.
Id.

170 See id.

See id. at 149.
It is precisely because of the inchoate and colonial nature of the present
status that Puerto Rico's present relationship with the United States must
evolve into one of political dignity, which does not infringe upon the
freedom of the United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico. Any status
formula that hinders freedom insofar as it does not guarantee the
participation of U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico in Congressional and
Presidential elections is unconstitutional ... and cannot be included as one
of the options, because slavery, even if voluntary, is repugnant to the
concept of freedom which is the essence of the U.S. Constitution.

171

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.75:509

principals of equality, which have characterized the development
of American jurisprudence during the twentieth century, have
not yet been established. Clearly there is a need for "a more
searching judicial inquiry"'172 in order to protect "a discrete and
insular minority" 173 that is denied its full benefit of U.S.
citizenship by a jurisprudence that was discarded long ago. 74
Moreover, the case illustrates the need for non-judicial reform
that will enable the U.S. citizen residents of Puerto Rico to vote
in presidential elections, by ending an archaic institution that is
obnoxious to the basic tenants of modern democracy-the
Electoral College.
IV. ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM AS A MEANS TO ENDING THE
CITIZENSHIP DISTINCTION IN VOTING RIGHTS.

Each time the inability of U.S. citizen residents of the
territories to vote for President is challenged on constitutional
grounds, or a version of the issue is presented for adjudication,
the respective courts cite the need for a constitutional
amendment as a remedy, 175 with the exception of the district
172 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 at 152 n.4 ("[Pirejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily relied upon to protect minorities ...
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."); see also Igartua de
la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2000) (Torruella, J., concurring).
In citing Carolene Products,Judge Torruella noted an instance of a more searching
judicial inquiry, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The judge noted the
instant matter was not a suitable one for a more searching judicial inquiry because
of the express terms governing presidential selection. It is manifest, as the
concurrence hints, that a more searching judicial inquiry is needed for all matters
that pertain to the rights of U.S. citizen residents of Puerto Rico, and by implication,
other U.S. territories. The Constitution does not form such an express bar because
of the territories' residents' lack of representation in the ordinary course of the
American political process.
173 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 at 152 n.4. Arguably, a more fitting
example other than U.S. territorial residents cannot be found.
174 See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
175 See Sanchez v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 239, 242 (D.P.R. 1974) (stating
the need for a vote for statehood by the residents of Puerto Rico, or a constitutional
amendment extending the presidential vote); see also Attorney General of Guam v.
United States, 738 F.2d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[A] constitutional amendment
would be required to permit plaintiffs to vote in a presidential election"); Igartua de
la Rosa v. United States, 842 F. Supp. 607, 609 (D.P.R. 1994) ("[G]ranting U.S.
citizens residing in Puerto Rico the right to vote in presidential elections would
require either that Puerto Rico become a state, or that a constitutional amendment,
similar to the Twenty-Third Amendment, be adopted."); Romeu v. Cohen, 121 F.
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court in Igartua de la Rosa.17 6 As a result of this bar, the
respective courts have offered only verbal support as relief to the
cause represented by the plaintiffs. 7 7 The most often cited relief
is either an amendment similar to the Twenty-Third, or
78
statehood for Puerto Rico.1
Rather than amending the Constitution similarly to the
Twenty-Third Amendment or altering the political status of
Puerto Rico, 17 9 the most effective means of providing relief and
extending the federal franchise to all territorial residents, would
be an amendment to the Constitution eliminating the Electoral
College. In its place, Congress should provide for direct election
of the President, with participation prefaced on U.S. citizenship,
rather than state residency. Establishing the right to vote as a
function of citizenship would end a citizen's dependency upon a
particular political entity for the right to exercise the franchise.
It would also end the inconsistency between case holdings
declaring the right to vote fundamental and strictly reading
Article II, Section 1.180 Moreover, it would end an institution

Supp. 2d 264, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that "only a constitutional amendment or
Puerto Rican statehood can provide the cure").
176 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140, 148 (D.P.R.
2000).
177 See, e.g., Sanchez, 376 F. Supp. at 242 ('The Court shares in the expression
of these views and is of the opinion that it is inexcusable that there still exists a
substantial number of U.S. citizens who cannot legally vote for the President and
Vice President of the United States."); Romeu, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
178 This much debated and problematic option is beyond the scope of this
comment and is not treated except in a collateral fashion.
179 It is conceivable that a proposed amendment could be crafted to include all
residents of U.S. territories, though this solution would present apportionment
problems within the Electoral College. If a delegation of electors were assigned to
represent all territorial residents at large, the differing political interests present
between communities separated by vast distances might not be properly addressed.
Apportioning electors for each territory would add at least fifteen new electors to
the college (assuming the pattern set by the Twenty-Third Amendment were
followed). A case could be made that the small populations of certain of these
territories were over represented, as compared with Puerto Rico, whose
approximate 3.8 million citizen residents would possess the same number of seats in
the Electoral College. This would present a similar problem as was presented in the
voter apportionment cases. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Rather
than changing the political status of all the territories involved, eliminating the
Electoral College makes that status irrelevant for the purposes of the presidential
election.
180 See Attorney General of Guam v. United States, 738 F.2d 1017, 1018-19
(9th Cir. 1984) (holding U.S. citizens residing in the territories cannot vote in
election for President or Vice President).
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that is counterintuitive to the inherent principles of American
democracy, 181 as well as the evolution of constitutional
182
thought.
A.

The ContemporaryElectoralCollege
The original system that delegated the responsibility for
choosing the President to the several states has maintained legal
legitimacy, despite the revolution in perceptions regarding the
nature of the right to vote. 183 The reasons for the creation of the
Electoral College are well documented, 184 and it is also
recognized as never having functioned as designed. 185 The
Electoral College has been much maligned 186 and the need for its
continued existence questioned. 8 7 The presidential electoral
181 See Penton v. Humphrey, 264 F. Supp. 250, 251 (S.D. Miss. 1967) (quoting
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963)) ("The only weighting of votes sanctioned
by the Constitution concerns matters of representation, such as the allocation of
Senators irrespective of population and the use of the [Ellectoral [Clollege in the
choice of a President."). The use of weighted voting is contrary to the development
and adherence to the doctrine of one person, one vote and remains viable as a result
of the constitutional sanction.
182 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d. 140, 148 (D.P.R.
2000).
183 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The
Twenty-Third Amendment also alters the text of Article H, Section 1 to the extent it
provides electors to a political entity that is not a state.
184 See THE FEDERALIST No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton states:
It was desirable, that the sense of the people should operate in the choice
of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end
will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men, chosen by the people for the special purpose,
and at the particular conjuncture.
It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by
men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and
acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation and to a judicious
combination of all the reasons and inducements, which were proper to
govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow
citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the
information and discernment requisite to make such complicated
investigations.
It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to
tumult and disorder.
Id.
185 See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 233 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
186 See id. at 232 ("Electors, although eminent, independent, and respectable,
officially became voluntary party lackeys and intellectual non-entities .... As an
institution the Electoral College suffered atrophy almost indistinguishable from
rigormortis.").
187 See id. at 234.
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system effectively creates fifty-one separate, winner-take-all
presidential elections. 8 8 Legislation has been introduced to
amend the Constitution to eliminate the Electoral College, 189 and
to replace it with a direct popular election. 190 To do so would be
consistent with precedents that recognize the voting rights of
191
citizens and diminish traditional aspects of states' rights.
The shortcomings of the current system became obvious
during the presidential election of 2000. The winner of the
electoral vote was not the winner of the popular vote, and the
margin of victory in the determinative state was effectively nonThe demise of the whole electoral system would not impress me as a
disaster. At its best it is a mystifying and distorting factor in presidential
elections which may resolve a popular defeat into an electoral victory. At
its worst it is open to local corruption and manipulation, once so flagrant
as to threaten the stability of the country. To abolish it and substitute
direct election of the President, so that every vote wherever cast would
have equal weight in calculating the result, would seem to me to gain for
simplicity and integrity of our governmental process.

Id.

188 Maine and Nebraska are the only exceptions to the winner-take-all system.
The electoral votes in these states are assigned based on the popular vote in each of
the respective state's congressional districts. See Note, Rethinking the Electoral
College Debate: The Framers,Federalism, and One Person, One Vote, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2526, 2531 (2001) (noting that Maine and Nebraska use the district system
while all the other states use a "winner-take-all" system).
189 See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 23, 106th Cong. (1999) ("Proposing an amendment to
the Constitution of the United States to abolish the [E]lectoral [Clollege and to
provide for the direct popular election of the President and Vice President of the
United States.").
190 See id.
Section 1: The President and Vice President shall be elected by the people
of the several states and the District constituting the seat of government of
the United States.
Section 2: The electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite
for electors of Senators and Representatives in Congress from that state,
except that the legislature of that state may prescribe less restrictive
qualifications with respect to residence and Congress may establish
uniform residence and age qualifications.
Id. It can be seen that this particular proposal is problematic with respect to
territorial residents in that it addresses the question with reference to only the
citizens of the several states and District of Colombia, and yet gives state
legislatures and Congress the power to change residency requirements. The
proposal can be read to exclude territorial residents by the express language, or
include them by the grant of authority to Congress and the several states to alter
residency requirements.
191 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (holding apportionment of
congressional districts was not the exclusive domain of the state legislature and
that issues of apportionment were not non-justiciable political questions); see also
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (adhering to the one man, one vote doctrine).
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existent. 192 The voters of Florida faced disenfranchisement when
the state legislature sought to name its own, uncontested state of
electors. The United States Supreme Court was called upon to
rule upon the constitutionality of the manner in which the
results of the Florida election were contested. This ruling
effectively, but not legally, decided the presidency, as the
electors remained constitutionally free to vote for whomever they
chose. 193 Several members of the House of Representatives
challenged the validity of the results of the electoral vote during
a joint session of Congress, which had become largely
ceremonial. 19 4 Most importantly, the system functioned correctly
and certified a winner who was not the choice of the majority of
the citizenry.
B.

The Need For ElectoralReform

The Igartua de la Rosa decision, in conjunction with the
election debacle of 2000, offers a new opportunity to reflect upon
195
and urge electoral reform. An inclusively written amendment
to the Constitution would eliminate the political status of each of
the territories as a relevant factor in enfranchising those citizens
residing therein. Eliminating the Electoral College offers the
most efficient means 96 of resolving the condition of subjugation,
which is perpetuated by keeping the citizens of the territories
un-enfranchised for the purposes of presidential elections.

192 The Florida popular vote was effectively a tie. See Counting the Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at A24 (noting Florida's certified results are 2,910,492 votes
for Bush and 2,910,192 votes for Gore).
193 The final tally in the Electoral College was 271 votes for George W. Bush
and 266 votes for Albert Gore with one elector pledged to Albert Gore from the
District of Columbia not voting to protest the lack of representation in Congress for
the District of Colombia. See Walsh & Eilperin, supra note 30, at Al. It must be
noted that a defection of two electors from the Bush majority would have thrown the
election into the House of Representatives, assuming the faithless Elector from the
District of Colombia had voted for Vice President Gore. See Ross & Josephson, supra
note 105, at 745 (noting that Electors are free to use their discretion to choose any
candidate they wish).
194 During the counting of the electoral votes in the constitutionally mandated
joint session of Congress on January 6, 2000, twenty challenges to the electoral vote
from Florida were voiced, but each failed in that their respective points of order
were not supported by a member of the Senate as required by 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
See Walsh & Eilperin, supra note 30, at Al.
195 See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 23, 106th Cong. (1999) (illustrating how not to extend
the franchise to the territories with a constitutional amendment).
196 See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 233 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Specifically, by avoiding the issue of the political status of
the territories in question, an amendment eliminating the
Electoral College 197 would extend the franchise to U.S. citizen
residents of Puerto Rico without having to resolve an intractable
political issue. 198 It would effectively bifurcate the question of
statehood for Puerto Rico, which is more of a question pertaining
to political organization of an entity, from voting in presidential
elections, which has evolved into a question of personal liberty.
Nothing would preclude Congress from removing citizenship
from current U.S. residents in Puerto Rico, should those
residents choose independence. 199 By removing citizenship,
Congress could remove the basis for participation in presidential
elections from those individuals residing in a newly independent
200
Puerto Rico.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court in Igartua de la Rosa is
significant, despite the erroneous legal conclusions. The court
has offered the U.S. citizen residents of Puerto Rico judicial
recognition of their un-enfranchised status that goes beyond
mere judicial agreement with its outrageous nature.
The
decision illustrates significant justification to eliminate the
Electoral College, which is repugnant to the principles and
197 The most compelling argument for keeping the current system appears to be
that without weighted voting, the populations of the smaller states would be
overlooked in an effort to secure votes in the densely populated areas of the larger
states. See John H. Cox, The Electoral College Works, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8, 2000, at

N26 (noting that the Electoral College was originally put in place to prevent large
states from dominating the union). This issue could be addressed through the
current system of campaign financing, by apportioning funds on the basis of state or
territorial population, and conditioning the payment of those funds on a candidate's
level of activity in that particular locality.
198 The issue of statehood, independence, or continued Commonwealth status
was addressed by a non-binding referendum in November 1993, when Puerto Rican
citizens opted for continued commonwealth status by a narrow majority. Ellen
Perlmutter, Voters Reject StatehoodReferendum, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov.
29, 1993, at D3 (noting that the margin of victory for continued commonwealth
status over statehood was "just 37,000 out of 1.7 million ballots cast").
199 See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) (holding Congress could rescind
any grant of citizenship granted by statute). As the grant of citizenship to residents
of Puerto Rico is statutory rather than constitutional-unlike residents of one of the
several states who are defined to be citizens in the Fourteenth AmendmentCongress has the power to revoke citizenship for residents of Puerto Rico by
repealing the Jones Act.
200 See id.
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aspirations asserted in the opinion, and recognized by modern
democratic principles. By attempting to eradicate injustice with
eloquence, reliance upon the fundamental truths contained in
his decision, and the will to see another unorthodox, yet
compelling justification to cure the wrong,20 1 Senior Judge Pieras
has moved the issue beyond the realm of a disputed political
right. He has successfully elevated the issue into the realm of
human rights, and effectively changed the nature of the debate.

201 See Romeu v. Cohen, 121 F. Supp. 2d 264, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Judge
Sheindlen repeats Judge Pireas's discussion of the underlying unfairness as follows:
Like United States citizens residing in the District of Colombia and the
fifty states, those residing in Puerto Rico have fulfilled the highest calling
of citizenship, fighting and dying in the battlefields in two world wars, the
Korean, Vietnam and Gulf wars. Still, despite paying for citizenship with
blood, U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico have not entered the
Presidential ballot box. It is inconceivable to our constitutional order to
expect the government can place our nation's sons and daughters in harm's
way and not recognize the power of those individuals to have a say in
electing those who will make that decision.
Id. (quoting Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 140, 145 (D.P.R.
2000)).

